Legal Decisions

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Andrew Price is an elected delegate of Local 638 of the Carpenters District Council of Greater St. Louis and Vicinity. His union decided to form a new local, "Local 57," to organize, not carpenters, but electricians! Price was having none of it. He thought it was a waste of union time and resources to challenge the IBEW's jurisdiction. And many of his fellow carpenters felt the same way. Price expressed his opposition with a bumper sticker. The union business representative asked him to remove it. Price refused and the business rep. filed charges for 1) violating District Council Trade Rule 22 -- failing to obey the business rep., and 2) violating the General Constitution of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters by "causing dissension amongst the Brotherhood."

On September 14, 2010 Price went before the Executive Board of his union and told them he was opposed to Local 57. The next day he was laid off work by his employer. And on September 17, Price was notified he would stand trial on the charges on October 17.

Price found an attorney and went into Federal District Court on September 24, asking the court to enjoin the union from violating his LMRDA free speech rights, and to order the union to stop his prosecution, or that of any other union member, for expressing his opposition to Local 57. And on October 10, 2010, that is exactly what the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois ordered.

The District Court held that Price met the three federal court criteria for granting a preliminary injunction: 1) plaintiff Price had to demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits, 2) that the harm he would suffer is greater than the harm the union would suffer if an injunction were granted, and 3) that the injunction is in the public interest. The greater the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, the less significant is the harm to the defendant.

The court also held that Price met the three LMRDA criteria to prevail on his violation of free speech claim. First, it was clear to the court that Price was brought up on charges because he spoke his mind with regard to his opposition to Local 57. Second, it found that the use of union resources to support Local 57 is a legitimate subject for members to discuss and express their point of view. Price believed that Local 57 was established to raid other unions and that this policy hurts the long-term goals of the UBC, and violates the principles of union solidarity and brotherhood. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in an earlier case that Title 1, the free speech provision of the LMRDA, was meant to track the First Amendment rights of the U.S. Constitution - the right to speak your mind without fear of reprisal, in Marshall v. Local 701 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers-F.3d-2010 WL 2853348 at #3 (7th Circuit July 21, 2010). Third, the court noted that the union's attempt to put Price on trial was an act that could reasonably be expected to deter Price from expressing his opinions and would deter the future expression of all those who elected him as a union delegate and those members who are also opposed to Local 57.

While the LMRDA contains a provision that may require a plaintiff to exhaust his union remedies before he sues in federal court, the use of the word "may," instead of "shall," leaves it up to the court to decide if the plaintiff has to exhaust his remedies before he can bring an action. In this instance the court, relying on precedent, held that the protection of freedom of speech is always in the public interest and any repression of freedom of speech, irrespective of the length of time involved, causes irreparable harm to that interest. Accordingly, Price was not required to exhaust his union remedies.

The union argued that it had tried to balance the harm to Price against the harm an injunction would cause the union in its struggle against the "dual unionism" it accused Price of advocating. But there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that Price was engaged in dual unionism. The court found him to be a loyal member of the Carpenters -- he did not try to induce its members to join another union. His dissent was based on a legitimate concern for how the resources of the union, of which he was a life-long member and an elected delegate, were used. The court rejected this specious line of defense.

In short Price proved to the court's satisfaction that he was likely to prevail on the merits, i.e. the union violated his LMRDA free speech rights; that he would suffer irrevocable harm if the trial proceeded, i.e. that the threat of the trial represses his freedom of expression; that the public interest is harmed, i.e. members of the local would be intimidated from expressing their opposition to Local 57; and that all the above outweighs any harm the union might suffer in not being able to prosecute its spurious charges against Price. A victory for free speech.